Τρίτη, 6 Ιουλίου 2010

Varieties of Lacanian Anti-Utopianism

Το παρακάτω είναι το κείμενο της ανακοίνωσής μου στο "The Specters of Utopia", το 11ο Συνέδριο της Εταιρίας Ουτοπικών Σπουδών που αρχίζει αύριο στο Lublin της Πολωνίας.
RD (Αντώνης)

Varieties of Lacanian Anti-Utopianism

In a recent essay[i] in which I attempted to map the generic modalities possible within the larger constellations of anti-utopia and dystopia, I argued for the existence of a distinct type of anti-utopia, which I termed “critical anti-utopia” and described thus:

works of non-fiction—particularly works in the areas of philosophy, psychoanalysis and political theory—which are opposed to Utopianism, but without either upholding the desirability of the current social order or rejecting the prospects of radical social change. Such texts do not tend to criticize specific Utopian texts. Their tendency is to presume the existence of “Utopianism”, which they render synonymous with a number of inadmissible presuppositions, including the idea of the possibility and desirability of total social unity and harmony, the erasure of all antagonisms, the withering away of political sociality, the positive achievement of full community, the privileging of transcendence, or the emphasis on the deferral of radical change into an unspecified and essentially elusive future. Critical anti-utopianism is not traditionally associated with a conservative politics. It is in fact the dominant trend in post-1968 Left social thought...One might say that this sub-category, a distinctly late modern one, has twin—and complexly entangled—roots both in Marx’s own critique of the abstract predictions of Utopian Socialism and in Freud’s and Lacan’s ruthless exposure of the compensatory consolations of fantasy and the Imaginary.

What I would like to explore in some more detail here is the specific sub-category of the critical anti-utopia that is linked to the theoretical and critical work of the so-called “Lacanian Left”. The term, coined as a contemporary counterpart of Paul Robinson’s 1967 reference to a “Freudian Left”[ii], designates a group of political theorists and philosophers commonly indebted to the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan and embracing positions lying left of the hegemonic discourses of liberal democracy, from the “radical democratic” positions of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to the “Communist Idea” espoused by Alain Badiou and, more recently, Slavoj Zizek. My basic contentions will be two: first, that the encounter between Lacanianism and Utopianism constitutes one of the most ambiguous, productive and energetic sites of left-wing political theory today—a claim already evidenced by the combined theoretical weight of the names I have just listed; and secondly, that so-called “Lacanian anti-utopianism” may itself be an oversimplifying and misleading way of naming the diverse and largely conflicting modes of an encounter between Utopianism and the political valences of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

To put it otherwise, Ruth Levitas’s recent suggestion that “Lacanian psychoanalysis” is a discourse whose effects are “dystopian rather than utopian” (Levitas xiv) is one no Lacanian Leftist would be likely to agree with, either because they would rather identify Lacan with a political anti-utopianism geared to precisely the prevention of totalitarian dystopias, or because, quite paradoxically, they would distance their use of Lacan from any monolithic and monological conception of “anti-Utopianism” as such. To paraphrase Yannis Stavrakakis, “Lacanian anti-utopianism” is hence less the name of an empirical positivity than of an internal division[iii], one that splits theorists for whom Lacan is the principle advocate of a politically and conceptually “radical anti-Utopianism” from ones who use his work as a means of reconceptualizing the Utopian project from a psychoanalytically informed perspective, and from ones seeking to emphasize that it is either impossible or undesirable to be “anti-Utopian” as such, because what is rather at stake is the specification of the kind of Utopianism you want to set yourself against. As we will see, and this is in fact a third, albeit derivative contention, such divisions do not merely emerge between different theoretical positions but tend to fracture such positions from within.

Of course, the question of the encounter between Utopianism and psychoanalysis is not a new one; so-called Freudo-Marxism, one of the vectors of intellectual development of the Frankfurt School, constituted an attempt to reconcile Marxism and Freudianism on the grounds of a holistic critique of repression, conceived not simply in class or political but also in psychic and individual terms. Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization (1955) became the manifesto of a generation prone to believe that political authoritarianism relies heavily on the manipulation of the mechanisms of individual psychic life—whether those be internalization and projection, or displacement, sublimation and disavowal. For Marcuse and his advocates in the 1960s therefore, social emancipation required a reconfiguration of psychic life, an attempt to direct libido away from the forces associated with violence and death and toward the life-affirming, community-building instincts of Eros. A society lying beyond the limits of what Marcuse called “repressive de-sublimation” would accordingly be capable of sublimating individual desires in directions that would benefit revolutionary transformation without recourse to state violence; it would be not simply more equitable and less reliant on the dynamics of repression and obedience but also more psychically healthy, more capable of creative expression and happiness at both individual and collective levels.

The fast decline of the countercultural Utopianism emblematized by May 1968, its degeneration into individualistic excesses of sexual abandon or drug addiction, and, by the mid 1970s, its full absorption into a re-invigorated and ever-more hedonistic vision of entrepreneurial and consumerist utopia, contributed to the fast discrediting of Marcuse’s vision, and, simultaneously, to the unearthing of the skeptical, pessimistic, and even explicitly anti-Utopian strands that were inherent in Freud’s metapsychological works, particularly in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and in Civilization and its Discontents (1930). David Bleich’s Utopia: The Psychology of a Cultural Fantasy, published in the emblematically dystopian year that was 1984, ridiculed Utopian expectations, chastising them by way of evoking a Freudian sobriety prone to view utopian desires as signs of psychic maladjustment and arrested development. For Bleich, Utopianism constituted a symptom of immaturity and of the will to regression, a sign of indulgence in infantile fantasies of reality-transforming omnipotence and of their tethering to a death-intoxicated nirvana principle, an incestuous desire for a return to the ataraxic, a-chronic condition of the womb (whether that be in the guise of a return to nature and to a plenitudinous Earth or in that of visions of uninterrupted peace within an effectively post-political community). The slogan “soyons réalistes, demandons l’ impossible” that drove the utopian enthusiasm of the soixant-huitards had by Bleich’s own time degenerated into the diagnostic symptom of psychological deviance, the mark of a stunted adolescence which obstinately refused to accept the “reality principle”, opting for pursuits ranging from the compulsive and neurotic desire for organization to the lethally psychotic quest for unlimited jouissance.[iv]

Lacan’s own skepticism toward the prospects that inspired Marcuse’s Freudo-Marxism is frequently seen as something encapsulated in his own memorably chilly response to the period’s fervent demands for a thorough, revolutionary transformation of social relations. Though he had suspended his seminar in solidarity with the teacher’s strike and even met with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the famous student leader, Lacan would greet student protests at Vincennes a year later with withering irony: “[T]he aspiration to revolution has but one conceivable issue, always, the discourse of the master. That is what experience has proved. What you, as revolutionaries, aspire to is a Master. You will have one”.[v] In his introduction to a special issue of the psychoanalytic journal Umbr(a) devoted to the question of Utopia, Ryan Anthony Hatch accordingly concedes that, to the extent that the “promise of psychoanalysis” as codified by Freud and refined by Lacan is “neither personal happiness nor a happy return to the shared norms of the social field”, psychoanalysis “appears to be an intrinsically anti-utopian venture”.[vi]

“Appears”, however, is an awfully tricky word—one which no one, least of all those trained in psychoanalysis, would be likely to put much stock on. Indeed, Adrian Johnston’s “A Blast from the Future”—the issue’s most thorough treatment of the question of Lacan’s relationship to utopianism—begins by documenting the extreme scarcity and critical edginess of Lacan’s references to “utopia” (mentioned only four times in the twenty-seven year course of his Seminar) only to conclude that Lacan’s hostility is aimed at a specific kind of utopia, “that of an entirely happy set of sustainable circumstances in which all serious dissatisfactions are resolved without remainder”[vii]. In short, Johnston takes Lacan’s anti-utopianism as something directed against the kind of utopia that writers as diverse as Swift, Dostoevsky, and H.G. Wells had already called into question and that the “critical utopias” of the 1970s relinquished altogether, even as the Lacanian Marxism of Louis Althusser would emphasize that even a fully emancipated society would not be free of antagonisms and, hence, of the need for ideology, for imaginary refractions of the real social relations which govern the existence of individuals.[viii] In Johnston’s argument, the Lacanian critique of utopia is based on his insistence on the difference and even discrepancy between “the organization of desires and the organization of needs”[ix], one which dictates that there remain aspects of subjectivity that are recalcitrant to the benefits of even the most rational and beneficent reorganization of social relations.[x] Accordingly, visions of utopia as “jouissance expected”—anticipations of a state wherein this discrepancy or gap would be eliminated altogether—belong to the realm of pure fantasy, and thus, to the realm of “illusory compensations for and resolutions of past grievances”[xi] rather than to that of a genuine, unconditioned futurity. Lacan’s sarcastic response to the revolutionary fervor of the soixant-huitards is then a way not of monolithically denouncing radical aspirations but, on the contrary, of asking them to reflexively radicalize themselves by severing their relationship to the ontogenetic and phylogenetic past. Lacan, Johnston argues, asks us not to denounce “revolution” as such, but a particular vision of revolution, one that would exhaust itself to another turn of the wheel of libidinal and social history, another mortgaging of the future to the resentful ghosts of the past, and hence another appeal to a “Master”, a big Other who would set things right. It was, one ought to add, not Freud but Marx who provided the initial framework for such emphasis on safeguarding the potential for revolutionary change from the psychic operations that bind utopian anticipation to insidious repetition:

The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language. Thus Luther put on the mask of the Apostle Paul, the Revolution of 1789-1814 draped itself alternately in the guise of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire, and the Revolution of 1848 knew nothing better to do than to parody, now 1789, now the revolutionary tradition of 1793-95. In like manner, the beginner who has learned a new language always translates it back into his mother tongue, but he assimilates the spirit of the new language and expresses himself freely in it only when he moves in it without recalling the old and when he forgets his native tongue.[xii]

Yet this is not to say that all interpretations of Lacanian anti-utopianism are as open to nuance and ambiguity as Johnston’s, which concludes with a call for a “new utopian politics” that “truly struggles to rise to the particular challenges revealed by psychoanalysis”.[xiii] Yannis Stavrakakis’s work, in Lacan and the Political (1999), and more recently, in the Lacanian Left (2007), for instance, resolutely refuses any reconciliation between Lacanianism and Utopianism. Writing from within an ideological framework that valorizes the radicalization of democracy against both its post-political neutralization and its vitiation by totalitarian ideologies, Stavrakakis argues that the “Lacanian conceptual and theoretical apparatus” can provide crucial ways of moving beyond the impasses generated by the “crisis of utopian politics”—a politics which is said to entrap our “political imagination” in a “suffocating strait-jacket”.[xiv] Indeed, Stavrakakis elevates utopianism to the status of the principle enemy of a Lacanian ethics of the political; in the process, of course, he produces his own definition of utopia, one that is effectively constituted by a series of references to its “dangers”.[xv] Principal among them is utopia’s dependence on a “fantasmatic ethics of harmony”[xvi] which disavows the foundational status of antagonism for any open-endedly agonistic conception of democracy: “Utopias”, he notes, are “images of future human communities in which […] antagonisms and the dislocations fuelling them (the element of the political) will be forever resolved, leading to a reconciled and harmonious world.”[xvii] Impressively, this remark evokes Louis Marin’s famous definition of utopia as an “imaginary resolution” of social contradiction without, nonetheless, taking into consideration the fact that Marin argued for a conception of utopia that moves far beyond its iconic nature, asking us to take into account those semiotic, processual aspects of the utopian text which allow it to register precisely those antagonisms and contradictions that Stavrakakis considers utterly eliminated from it. Indeed, in his own introduction to the Umbr(a) issue on utopia, Ryan Anthony Hatch is far more careful in noting, pace Marin, that a text like More’s Utopia can hardly be reduced to the proposals it contains, for “there exists [in it] some tension intrinsic to utopian thinking—an intractable difference from itself”.[xviii]

The erasure of such self-difference paves the path for an account that is also prone to overlook, as Stavrakakis’s does, the difference between “utopia” as a textual problem and “utopia” as an abstract and speculative category of theoretical generalization, or that between, to take another example, the elements of closure that characterize the depiction of utopian society in the classical utopias of the 19th century and the aporetic status of such depiction in the critical or ambiguous utopias of the 1970s. Stavrakakis’s anti-utopianism thus quickly transforms itself into a “j’ accuse” against an enemy who is criticized on the grounds of its tendency to produce fantasmatic enemies while being itself constructed as a fantasmatic enemy, a creature that exists merely as a composite of anti-utopian invectives less indebted to Lacan himself than to the anti-communist rhetoric associated with a Popper or a Cioran:

every utopian fantasy construction needs a ‘scapegoat’ in order to constitute itself…the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatized scapegoat. The naivety—and also the danger—of utopian structures is revealed when the realization of this fantasy is attempted…There exists then a crucial dialectic between the universal fantasy of utopia and the particularity of the—always local—enemy who is posited as negating it. The result of this dialectic is always the same: ‘The tragic paradox of utopianism has been that instead of bringing about, as it promised, a system of final and permanent stability, it gave rise to utter restlessness, and in place of a reconciliation between human freedom and social cohesion, it brought totalitarian coercion.[xix]

It comes as no surprise, given such determination to raise utopia to the status of the arch-enemy of democratic ethics, that utopia becomes itself the ground of contention, explicit or implicit, between Stavrakakis’s brand of political Lacanianism, with its frequently subterranean debts to Castoriadis’s passionate anti-Platonism and to Laclau’s and Mouffe’s emphasis on the irreducibility of lack, exclusion and antagonism in every democratic order, and that which one encounters in the work of Zizek or Badiou, thinkers with a decidedly less hostile attitude to the legacy of revolutionary insurgency—representatives, in fact, of a “red” Lacanianism linked to re-appropriation of Hegel, in the first case, and of Plato in the second (and need one be reminded that, along with Marx, Plato and Hegel constitute the two emblematic figures of the “enemy” of the open society in Popper’s foundational work of modern anti-utopianism?) Hence, Stavrakakis’s more recent The Lacanian Left suggests that Zizek has shifted perniciously from a “Lacanian” to a “Utopian” Left, perversely idealizing the efficacy of a “one off” radical act in accessing a real beyond any kind of symbolic mediation, and using such idealization “as a protective device against dealing with the decay of utopia, with the fact that the realization of even the most perfect utopian dream is bound to encounter its own limits in the flow of historical time, which is impossible to control.”[xx]  In Stavrakakis’s argument, then, it is precisely Zizek’s inability to “mourn” utopia as a defunct desire that disqualifies him from membership in the ranks of true Lacanians and registers him as yet another “disillusioned leftist”[xxi] who has failed to take seriously Lacan’s insights into the irreducibility of lack for both the subject and the other and into the truth of the “not-all” of reality, of its structuring around a constitutive gap.

Zizek’s rejoinder, in his In Defense of Lost Causes, is threefold: first, and in an attempt to rebuff the criticism that his vision of radical transformation effectively exhausts itself in the theatrics of spectacular “one offs”, he argues for the vital importance, within revolutionary conjunctures, of “the utopian explosions of political imagination apropos the reorganization of the everyday”[xxii]; secondly, he reminds his critic that “utopia” is not a homogenous or unitary entity but contains at least two highly incompatible acceptations: that of a “simple imaginary impossibility”, which is of course inadmissible from the perspective of a Lacanian ethics of the real, and that of an enactment of that which only appears “impossible” from “within the framework of the existing social relations” or what Badiou’s closely associated argument would call “the state of the situation”[xxiii]; and lastly, he acerbically notes that the hypostatization of the “contingency of social life” as absolute ground for democratic ethics—a trait that characterizes the work of the “democratic” Lacanians (Castoriades, Laclau, Mouffe, and, of course, Stavrakakis himself)—is reversely grounded in the silent acceptance of the “‘essentialist predominance of capitalism, which, itself, no longer appears as one of the possible modes of production, but as simply the neutral ‘background’ of the open process of contingent (re)articulations.”[xxiv]

I will conclude with a brief reflection on the import of the connection between “utopia” and the notion of the “symptom”, a connection not simply central to Bleich’s or Stavrakakis’s brand of psychoanalytic anti-utopianism—where utopianism is itself figured as a symptom of one or another form of psychic distortion, from regression to perversion, not to mention psychosis, the subject of a brief report by practicing Lacanian analyst Danielle Bergeron[xxv]—but also crucial for the meta-theoretical discussion of the place of Utopia in the discourse of the Lacanian Left: it is telling that Stavrakakis speaks of the need to “mourn” utopia and thus to forego our libidinal attachments to it, while Zizek repeatedly refers to utopia’s spectral claims, to “the excess of the utopian Idea that survives its historical defeat”.[xxvi] Utopia is in this second sense the organizing symptom of political Lacanianism itself: it is what returns in it as an unsettled claim, irrepressible, refusing to rest content with efforts to excise it from an “orthodox” version of Lacanian discourse or to proclaim its regressiveness and obsolescence:  Derrida, whom Stavrakakis marshals to the defense of a democratie à venir[xxvii] has not been safe from the imputation of developing his own brand of ethics-based utopianism; Badiou, whose conception of the event Stavrakakis juxtaposes to the theological oversimplifications of Zizek’s “act” has been involved in an extensive re-reading of Plato’s Republic that has linked “utopia” to the uncompromising infinity of the “Idea”; and the “concrete proposals” presented at the end of the Lacanian Left as instances of the modest, pragmatic priorities of radical democracy—Robin Blackburn’s proposal for the democratization of pension funds, Roberto Unger’s proposal for a social inheritance system, Hardt and Negri’s proposals for a minimum citizenship income[xxviii]—are ones that are hardly easy to differentiate from a large catalogue of utopian propositions, as Fredric Jameson’s demonstration of the passage from a “partial” demand like that of universal employment to the full-fledged “utopian leap” shows.[xxix] In short, far from furnishing a discourse that effectively lays the topic of utopia to rest, Lacanian anti-utopianism constitutes one of the most conflicted and ambivalent sites of its re-emergence as a question central to the future of political theory itself.

[i] Antonis Balasopoulos, “Anti-Utopia and Dystopia: Rethinking the Generic Field”, forthcoming, 2010.
[ii] Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics
, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 26-27.
[iii.] See Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left
, 4-5.
[iv] See David Bleich, Utopia: The Psychology of a Cultural Fantasy, UMI Research Press, 1984; and W. Warren Wagar, “The Best and Worst of Times”, Science Fiction Studies
14.1 (March 1987),
[v] Lacan’s response to a situationist protester in 1973 was similar in spirit: “What does organization mean if not a new order? A new order is the return of […] the discourse of the master”. Both passages quoted in Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left
, 2-3; see also Adrian Johnston, “A Blast from the Future: Freud, Marcuse and Snapping the Threads of the Past”, Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious, 2008, 71.
[vi] Ryan Anthony Hatch, “Tuché and Utopia”, Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious, 2008, 6.
[vii] Johnston, “A Blast from the Future”, 74.
[viii] “To my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses. I only need one example and proof of this: Lenin’s anguished concern to revolutionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus (among others), simply to make it possible for the Soviet proletariat, who had seized State power, to secure the future of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialism.
This last comment puts us in a position to understand that the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. The class (or class alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the (repressive) State apparatus, not only because the former ruling classes are able to retain strong positions there for a long time, but also because the resistance of the exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express itself there, either by the utilization of their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in them in struggle.” Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971 (orig. pub. 1970).
[ix] Lacan, Seminar VII, qtd. in Johnston, “A Blast from the Future”, 73.
[x] Johnston, “A Blast from the Future”, 73.
[xi] Ibid., 79.
[xii] Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
[xiii] Johnston, “A Blast from the Future”, 80.
[xiv] Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, London, Routledge, 1999, 9, 100.
[xv] Ibid., 9.
[xvi] Ibid., 9.
[xvii] Ibid., 100.
[xviii] Hatch, Tuché and Utopia”, 9.
[xix] Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, 100, 108.
[xx] Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left, 124, 139.
[xxi] Ibid., 275. See also 142.
[xxii] Slavoj Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes, London, Verso, 2008, 175; for similar remarks, see 265-66.
[xxiii] Ibid., 309-10.
[xxiv] Ibid., 348.
[xxv] See Danielle Bergeron, “Utopia and Psychosis: The Quest for the Transcendental”, trans. Michael Stanish, Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious, 2008, 13-33.
[xxvi] Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes 209. See also 207, 326, 394.
[xxvii] See Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, 111, 139, 163; Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes, 225; and Antonis Balasopoulos, “Ghosts of the Future: Marxism, Deconstruction, and the Afterlife of Utopia” Theory & Event 12.3 (2009) (n.p).
[xxviii] Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left, 282.See also Zizek’s remarks on this strategy in In Defense of Lost Causes, 330-31.
[xxix] See Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia”, New Left Review II 25 (Jan.-Feb. 2004): 37-8. After all, the distinction between “reformist” and “revolutionary” demands is never possible in advance, for within certain social and historical conditions the most brazenly revolutionary agenda can slide into sedate reformism (think of what happened to many of the Maoists of May 68), while the most modest reformist scheme may evolve into an ever-more ambitious project for radical social reconstruction (think of the distinct radicalization of the Chávez regime after the failed coup of 2002, under pressure of popular demands for redistribution of resources and control over the means of production); For more analytical discussions of these two examples, see Alain Badiou, “Roads to Renegacy”, interview with Eric Hazan, New Left Review II, 53 (Sept.-Oct. 2008) 125-133; and Jeffery Webber, “Venezuela under Chávez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twentieth-Century Socialism, 1999-2009”, Socialist Studies 6.1 (2010): 11-44.

9 σχόλια:

Disdaimona είπε...

Καλή επιτυχία Αντώνη στο συνέδριο.

RDAntonis είπε...

Ευχαριστώ, να σαι καλά.

celin είπε...

Τι κριμα που οι γνωσεις μου περι των Αγγλικων δε μου επιτρεπουν να πολαυσω το κειμενο!!

RDAntonis είπε...

Το πρόβλημα φίλε celin είναι ότι αποκλείεται να κάτσω να μεταφράσω στα ελληνικά δικά μου κείμενα! Έχω μια αλλεργία στη διαδικασία.

RDAntonis είπε...


Χαιρετίσματα από Βουδαπέστη και θενκς. Το τελευταίο σου σχόλιο πολύ χρήσιμο για να καταλάβω την αντίρρηση.;-)

SvT είπε...

η αποσυσκευασία του όρου ήταν ενδιαφέρουσα και χρήσιμη, έχοντας παρακάμψει -χωρίς να αγνοήσει- το γλωσσολογικό πλαίσιο που τον έχει καταδυναστεύσει. το βασικότερο, απέδωσε με ταχύτητα, ποικιλία και ειρμό τις αποχρώσεις της έννοιας στη Λακανική και μετα-Λακανική παράδοση και αυτό λειτούργησε βοηθητικά για να αντιληφθώ επίσης τις αποκλίσεις των αριστερών θεωρητικών που ανέφερες. δυστυχώς, όπως συμβαίνει στο τέλος κάθε ανάγνωσης, αισθάνομαι να γνωρίζω λιγότερα πράγματα τώρα απ'ότι πριν!

RDAntonis είπε...

Aberrations of Mourning=out of print. Θα το ψάξω με interlibrary loan, θέλω το κομμάτι για το Τζόζεφιν.

Τρίτομο έργο για nazi psychoanalysis? Αυτός είναι πιο παλαβός από τον Theweleit!! Και στη Santa Barbara! Θα τον ψάξω από κοντά.

rdDcom είπε...

Μόλις κοίταξα το Aberrations (400p) και έχει μια μόνο σελίδα για το Τζόζεφιν (βάσει του Index) (αναφέρεται στο τρίγωνο με τον Klopstock & Dora Dymant [με τον Brod ως τέταρτο], και στην παρανοϊκή αυτονόμηση της συγγραφικής περσόνας, ή κάτι τέτοιο), οπότε πρέπει να είναι σε κάποιο άλλο βιβλίο του η ανάλυση (εκτός αν την είδα στον ύπνο μου!)

rddemos είπε...

Από Δήμο: Σου έστειλα e-mail πήγαινε όποτε μπορέσεις στο «ιδιωτικό» site (είναι λίγο πολύ ΟΚ [1]). Δεν χρειάζεται να κάνεις τίποτε από άποψη διαχείρισης, απλά να δεις πως φαίνεται.

Νομίζω ότι (εφόσον έχουμε πλειοψηφία στη δημοσκόπηση) η καλύτερη λύση προς το παρόν είναι εγκαταστήσω εδώ το σύστημα σχολίων για όλες τις αναρτήσεις και να παραπέμπουμε τους αναγνώστες στο άλλο site για παλιά σχόλια (για reference). Ο συνολικός αριθμός των παλιών σχολίων είναι περίπου 400!, οπότε δεν είναι μεγάλη απώλεια.[2]

Εκεί απαγόρευσα τον σχολιασμό σε τρίτους, οπότε δεν απαιτείται διαχείριση. Επίσης θα αφαιρέσω τα λινκ στο youtube από τις μουσικές αναρτήσεις ώστε να μην υπάρξει πρόβλημα με το bandwidth (είναι free hosting οπότε είναι δυνατόν να πέσει αν πολλοί χρήστες βλέπουν βίντεο κ.λπ.)

[1] Δεν έγινε μεταφορά περίπου 60 αναρτήσεων (σύνηθες φαινόμενο, αν μεταφέρεις το blog από το blogger), όμως έχω κάνει συνολικό backup και θα τις αναρτήσω μια προς μια --- δεν είναι δύσκολο. Έτσι θα έχεις το σύνολο του site ως ενεργό backup αν τυχόν στο μέλλον θέλεις να μεταφέρεις τα στοιχεία κάπου αλλού, κ.λπ.

[2] Υπάρχει περίπτωση στο μέλλον να μπορέσει το Disqus να τραβήξει τα παλιά σχόλια από εδώ!